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POSSIBLE WORLDS 
Max J. Cresswell 
Victoria University of Wellington, Australia 
The following is an extract from the Pickwick PaperB. 
The visitor* talked, the Pickwickians listened, 
Mr. Tupman felt every moment more disposed for the 
ball. Mr. Pickwick's countenance glowed with an 
expression of universal philantropy; and Mr Winkle 
and Mr Snodgrass fell fast asleep. 
/1 am using the Pickwick Papers because almost every 
philosophical discussion about fiction uses Mr Pickwick./ 
Who is the Pickwick Papers about? Well it's about Mr 
Pickwick and Mr Snodgrass and Mr Tupman and Mr Winkle. • 
Is the Pickwick Papers true? No it's fiction. Did these 
men actually exist? No/they did not. There never was a 
Mr Pickwick or a Mr Snodgrass or a Mr Tupman or a Mr 
Winkle /though of course there may have been other 
people with the same names, but the Pickwick Papers wasn't 
about them/. But if there never were such people, it seems 
that the Pickwick Papers is not about anybody. And that's 
absurd, because the Pickwick Papers is about someone. 
It's about Mr Pickwick and Mr Snodgrass and Mr Tupman and 
Mr Winkle and Sam Weller and Mrs Bardell and Ben Allen 
and Bob Sawyer and Uncle Tom Cobbly and all. 
What is the solution to this philosophical puzzle? 
Compared with the quite remarkable philosophical ingenuity 
which has been expended on the problem of how to analyse 
talk about things which do not exist, my solution is 
simple almost to the point of naivite. I say that. Mr 
Pickwick and Mr Snodgrass and Mr Tupman and Mr Winkle 
do indeed exist all right, but not in the actual world, 
- 7 -
only in another possible world. They exist in the possible 
world in which all the things that are said to happen 
really do happen. In that possible world Mr Pickwick 
really is sued by Mrs Bardell and spends three months in 
the Fleet Street Prison» he really does witness an election 
in the borough of Eatanswill and he really does spend 
Christmas at Dingly Dell. 
Possible worlds are things we can talk about or 
imagine, suppose, believe in or wish for. We can never 
though ever get to a possible world which is not the real 
world? for if we could, , and it just needs a little 
recalling of science fiction to see how you'.^j^j^. think We 
might, then that would be part of the real world. That 
is because the real world mfeans the totality of what 
actually happens. 
When we say that a world is real world, we are of 
course speaking from the point of view of our own world. 
And a person in another possible world who speaks kbout 
the 'real world' of course means his world not ours. 
This is exactly parallel to the way we use the word now. 
If I say "It is now 1977" I mean that &t-the moment at 
which I am speaking it is 1977. And that is true. But 
if I had said it a year ago, that very same sentence 
would have been false for the moment of which I would 
then have been speaking would have been 1976, which is 
not 1977. Here is an extract from a story about another 
philosophically well known fictional entity: 
To the fountain of Pirene, therefore, people's 
great grandfathers had been in the habit of going 
I as long as they were youthful, and retained their 
faith in winged horses/, in hopes of getting a 
glimpse of the beautiful Pegasus. But of late years 
he had been very seldom seen. Indeed, there were 
many of the country folks, dwelling within an hour's 
walk of the fountain, who had never beheld Pegasus, 
and did not believe that there was any such 
creature in existence. 
Well, these disbelievers in Pegasus. Were they right 
or were they wrong? If some philosophers had their way 
the disbelievers would be right, for, as we know, there 
are no winged horses, and Pegasus doesn't exist. But of 
course the solution is very simple. For Pegasus does 
exist in the possible world of that piece of mythology, 
and so the disbelievers are wrong. The world in which • 
they do their disbelieving is a world in which Pegasus 
does otist. Of course they have their own belief worlds. 
For the world as they conceive it to be does not contain 
Pegasus. 
Well so much for the utility of the idea of a possible 
world. But is it just a fanciful way of speaking pr do 
they really exist? Are there possible worlds? Like a good 
philosopher I'm not going to give a straight answer. I 
am going to give a crooked answer, and that's "yes"» 
but I've got to explain first what I mean. 
I have heard it maintained that there's only one world 
the actual one. This is enunciated as if it were a 
truism and of course there is truism lurking in the 
bushes. For of course only the actual world is actual. • 
This is like saying there jLs only one moment of time, now 
But of course even if the present is the only moment 
which is with us, there are many other moments wich were 
or will be with us. So although the actual world is the 
only world which is actual yet there are many other 
worlds which might have been actual. 
I want to trade a bit on this parallel between actual 
vs possible and present vs past or future. I want you to' 
consider the question: Does the past really exist? And 
I want to link this with some moves which I believe were 
made during the days of the debate about evolution vs 
special creation. It was observed that certain fossil 
and other remains indicated that the earth must be 
considerably more than six thousand years old» indeed 
that it was many millions of years old. But, says the 
defender of special creation, such pieceB of evidence 
are neither here nor there. If, he says, the world 
was created 6,000 years ago then it would not have been 
a great deal more trouble to create at the Bame time all 
this so called evidence. It would be a pretty poor god 
who could not put in a few fossils at the same time, 
perhaps these were done at the end of the fourth day-
between the plants and the animals. Obviously they were 
put there as a test of faith. How do we answer this 
argument? We take it a bit further as I believe Bertrand 
Russell did. I claim that the world was created five 
minutes ago. But, I hear you cry, this building was put 
up twelve years ago. No at all, it was crealted five 
minutes ago looking as it had been here for the past 
twelve years. But', your voices clamour, we remember 
having dinner this evening more than five minutes ago. 
Not at all, you merely think you do. For you too were 
created five minutes ago with these so called memories 
Implanted in your brains. It would be a pretty poor god 
who could not do that. 
And here is our dilemma. For if we could suppose 
that the world was created five minutes ago then we could 
suppose it to have been created ten or fifteen minutes 
ago; or an hour, 6,000 years, 50 million years or any 
other stretch of time. And there would be no possible 
way of telling which was right. Some philosophers have 
said that the question has therefore no meaning. All I 
am going to suggest is that it's not a profitable 
question to ask. And the same goes for the question: 
"Does the' past really exist,?" when understood as a deep 
metaphysical question. There are however related questions 
we can answer. Don't ask: "Was the world really created, 
five minutes ago?" That is unanswerable. Ask: "Is the 
assumption that the world was created five minutes ago 
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compatible with a simple and coherent description of the 
physical laws which govern its behaviour as we observe 
it?" And the answer is noI In the world about us we 
observe physical regularities, which science has the job 
of systematizing. For these laws to work in a completely 
general fashion we need to suppose that the world has 
existed for a very long time» Otherwise the sodifioation 
of the regularities would be fd hoe and unformaliaable. 
So we now can give an answer to "Bees the past exist?", 
not a deep metaphyseal answer that it really does or 
really does not. But a pragmatic answer» that the only 
way to get a systematic theory of the behaviour of the 
observed world is to assume that there are moments of 
time which are past moments; 
Now baek to possible worlds. Bo they really exist? ly 
now you should see ,tohat £ am going to say. We must not 
ask whether they really jokist. We must, askt do they 
contribute to a systematic theory of the observed world? 
Possible worlds of course are unlike moments of time in 
that they do not contribute to physical science. Physical 
aaience is interested in discovering the regularities 
of this world. If I tell a fairy story in which a frog 
changes into a Prince, while it may be that that world 
will obey different scientific laws than ours, there is 
no reason for a scientist to get upset, or think that I 
have produced a new phenomenon for him to account for. 
So it is not to be expected that the question to be asked 
is whether possible worlds contribute to a systematic 
physical theory. Perhaps the question is whether they 
contribute to a good metaphysical theory. Be that as it 
may, I want for the remainder of this paper to describe 
some of the ways in which possible worlds have been used 
in order to explain some otherwise puzzling phenomena. 
The • key here is the systematic assumption of a 
collection of possible worlds. Think again of the parallel 
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with time. In ordinary discourse we speak of moments 
of time, periods of time, the beforeness of one moment 
and another. But exact discourse demands more. So we 
arrive at the mathematical model of time as the linearly 
ordered continuum of real numbers. This is what I mean 
by a systematic theory of the structure of time. Some-
thing of the same has happened with possible worlds. And 
it happened as the outcome of the task of giving a precise 
and systematic interpretation to that branch of logic' 
known as modal logic. 
Modal logic is concerned with analysing the validity 
of arguments involving things like "such and such must 
necessarily be true" or "so and so might possibly be 
true" or"such and such might have been true although it 
isn't." To study these arguments formally, i.e. in a 
systematic way, we have to be able to speak of truth and 
falsity, not merely in the actual world but in all possible 
worlds. Put more precisely we say that something is 
possibly true, relative to a given world, iff it actually 
is true in some world which is a possible world relative 
to the original world. Thus if we say that it is possible 
that men will fly to Mars we mean that among the worlds 
which we in this world are able to bring about, there 
occurs one in which men fly to Mars. And this can be so 
even if no one, in the actual world, ever does fly to 
Mars. The idea of one world being possible from another 
or, as we call it in the trade, one world being .accessible 
from another, has turned out to have opened up a fascinating 
area of pure logic in which both philosophers and 
mathematicians have been doing some very interesting work. 
For it turns out that the mathematical theory of relations 
when applied to the accessibility relation between possible 
worlds characterizes a huge variety of different systems 
of modal logic. 
But I'm not going to say much about modal logic, . 
fascinating as it is. There's a very good textbook for 
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those who want to pursue the subject. 
I want in fact to say a little bit about some applications 
of possible worlds in the philosophy of language. The philo-
sophical question which is at the back of all this is, very 
vaguely, What is meaning? or, perhaps a little less vaguely, 
What is going on when we say that the meaning of a 
sentence is such and such? For an adequate solution to 
this problem we must explain, in addition, how the 
meanings of complete sentences depend on the meanings 
of the words in them together with the syntactic structure 
of the sentence. 
Well, then let's take a sentence. Suppose I say, "There's i 
a dragon at the back of this room and he's breathing fire 
and smoke." It's all right, there isn't really one there. 
How could I get across the meaning of this sentence 
independently of using language? Well, suppose we had a 
machine /philosophers always like supposing they had 
machines to do bizarre things with/ by means of which we 
could shew on a screen a picture of each possible world. 
Actually we'd only need to shew the part of the world which 
involves this room. /Of course even this is an impossible 
task for there are infinitely many different ways the 
room could be and even the most ardent of colour slide 
fanatics that I know of has never quite managed to have 
an infinite collection./ As we shew each possible world 
we say Yes if there is a dragon in this room in that world 
and No if there is not. We assume that our hearer knows 
what we are up to. I.e. although he does not know the 
meaning of the sentence we are trying to teach him, he 
does know that we are going to say,'yes' if the world is 
one in which the sentence is true and 'no' if the world 
is one in which the sentence is false. So as a first 
approximation to the analysis of meaning I am going to 
say that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the 
worlds in which it is true and the worlds in which it is 
false. 
This has to be an approximation for a number of 
disparate reasons. First the meaning of a sentence of 
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ordinary language may bs vague BO that there are a o m a 
worlds in which we don't know whether to say that the 
sentence is true or false. Second the meaning may depend 
on the context of utterance, the word now e.g. refers to 
different moments in different utterances, the word I, 
refers in my mouth to someone different from the person 
it refers to in yours, and so on. All these problems 
require, and receive, the attention of the formal semanticist 
but for the moment I'm going to ask you t6 put them to one 
side and play along with the idea that we know the meaning 
of a sentence when we know, in any possible world whetheir 
the suntence is true, or whether it is false. /In fact if 
we know the est of worlds in which it is true we are 
thereby given the set in which it is false. They are all 
but those in which it is true./ 
I want to illustrate some recent work on the problem 
of what have been variously called counterfactuals, 
contrary-to-fact conditionals or subjunctive conditionals. 
/ 
These are sentences of the form "If it were the case that 
such and such then it would BIBO be the case that so and 
so". 
E.g. If there were a gorgon In this room you all 
be petrified. 
In these sentences the such and such antecedent of 
the conditional is frequently /though it need not always be/ 
false, and thus the name counterfactual. 
Let us now combine what we have said so far. It have 
made two points 
/A/ We need to shew how the meaning of a complex 
sentence can be obtained from the meaning of its parts and 
IB/ the meaning of a sentence is the set of possible 
worlds in which it is true. 
Combining /A/ and /B/ we see that the semantical 
problem of counterfactuals is the problem of getting from 
our knowledge that a sentence X is true in such and such 
worlds and false in the rest, and our knowledge that Y is 
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true in such and such worlds and false in the rest, an 
answer to the question of which worlds the sentence 
"If X were the case then Y would also be the case" 
is true in, and which it is false in. And this means 
that if we are presented with any particular given world 
we must decide whether, the complex conditional is true 
in that world or whether it is not. 
Take our example. We are in some given world and we -
want to know whether or not: 
If there were a gorgon in this room you would all 
be petrified. 
Is it true, is it false? If the world ia one in which 
there is a gorgon in the room then all we have to do 
is to see whether you are petrified. If you are then the 
conditional is true, if you are not, the conditional 
is false. But suppose there is no gorgon. What we do 
then is to look at the world which is like the given 
one in as many respects as it can possibly be except 
that /unlike the originally given world/ there is a 
gorgon in the room. We then look in that world to see whether 
you are petrified. If you are, then we say that the 
conditional was true in the original world. If you are not, 
that is was false. Put more generally the test is thiss 
"If X were so then Y would be too" 
is true in a world w iff in the nearest world to w in which 
X is true, Y is also true. When we write it in this way we 
see a crucial fact emerging. That is that if we know of 
any given world whether or not X and Y are true in that 
world, then we also know /assuming of course that we can 
say what counts as nearness of worlds, and that's a 
philosophical problem in itself/ of any given world 
whether the complex conditional is true or false in that 
world. To apply this test we need of course to have some 
idea of what counts as nearness of worlds. What the 
analysis does is shew how this knowledge determines the 
truth conditions of counterfactual sentences. 
Obviously the semantical study of natural language has 
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enormous philosophical and linguistic obstacles to overcome. 
Almost every day grammarians are uncovering subtleties of 
English and other languages which shew all kinds of theore-
tical hypotheses to be crude and simple-minded but at least 
I hope to have said enough to shew how possible worlds may 
have a role to play in this analysis. 
Finally, on perhaps a lighter note, there is an 
application of the theory of possible worlds in philosophical 
theology. Consider the so-called "argument from evil". The 
argument runs that God cannot be both all good .̂nd all 
powerful because if he were all good he would make the 
world as'good as it could possibly be. Clearly the world is 
not as good as it could possibly be so God cannot be both 
all good and all powerful. 
Variants of this argument are well known in philosophy 
and theology and they raise both theoretical and practical 
problems. I am only going to comment on that version of 
the argument, the version 1 sketched above, which purports 
to be a three line knock down argument against the 
existence of an all good and all powerful God. I shall use 
possible world theory to give an equally brief reply. While 
my reply will be superficial, it is, I believe no more so 
than the naive form of the original argument. It is this. 
Obviously the actual world is not as good as it could possibly 
be, but among the possible worlds there does exist the best 
of all possible worlds. So the question is not, why did not 
God create the best of all possible worlds, it is 
I a/ Why did God create some worlds which were not the 
best of all possible worlds? and 
/b/ Why did He make this world one of them? 
The answer to /a/ is this: 
To say that a possible world exists is to say that 
things could be that way. So that any possible world which 
can exist, must exist. Of course it need only be possible 
and not actual. 
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The answer to /b/ Is this: 
To ask why is this world not the best possible is just 
to ask, why is this world not different from the way it 
is. And that is just to ask, why is this world not a 
different one. When my son was four he asked what the 
time was. His mother told him that it was twenty to four. 
He asked "Why?". The answer to the person who says: "Why 
is this not the best of all possible worlds" is the same 
as the answer to the person who says "Why wasn't this 
paper over long ago?" 
Well now it is over. 
